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on the consistency of Kantian statism* 
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Jakob Huber, LSE (j.huber@lse.ac.uk)  
 
Abstract: The paper examines the consistency of recent Kantian 
justifications of state authority through reflection on the normative 
implications of states’ territorial nature. I claim that their conceptual 
structure leaves these accounts unable to close the justificatory gap that 
emerges at the transition from legitimate authority simpliciter, to legitimate 
state authority. None of the strategies Kantian statists have come up with in 
order to solve this problem – based on the proximity, occupancy, and 
permissive principles – provides the needed grounds on which to carve up 
the earth’s surface into jurisdictional domains. Yet, I conclude that this does 
not require Kantians to cede statist grounds altogether but to take a 
distinctly ‘global perspective’ on states. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The fact that, among the burgeoning literature on territorial rights, a 
distinctly Kantian position is by now well established speaks to a broader 
shift with regard to the way in which Kant is invoked by contemporary 
political philosophers:1 traditionally read as a paradigm cosmopolitan whose 
normative agenda (laid out in essays such as Toward Perpetual Peace) was 
happily appropriated for debates from the institutional design of a global 
political order to migration or human rights,2 recent years saw something of 
a ‘statist backlash’. Driven by a renewed interested in the Doctrine of Right, 
Kant’s main legal and political work, an increasing number of theorists 
discovered him as a proponent of a distinctively state-based morality 
(Hodgson 2010, Ripstein 2009, Stilz 2011b, Waldron 2011). In contemporary 
normative debates, these ‘Kantian statists’ most prominently advocate a 
genuinely moral obligation to leave the state of nature in order to establish 
and comply with legitimate states. The aim of this paper is to show that it is 
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precisely reflection on the territorial nature of modern statehood, which 
threatens to render this position incoherent. Ultimately, I hope to show, 
this leaves Kantian statism tenable only in a radically revised version. 
My argument unfolds as follows: In the first section of the paper, I 
delineate the normative concept of territorial jurisdiction and introduce the 
justificatory gap that emerges at the transition from theorising legitimate 
authority, to theorising legitimate state authority. I go on, in the second 
section, to set out why the Kantian statist framework – deriving the need for 
political authority from the problematic structure of unilateral property 
claims – has a uniquely hard time bridging the gap. The third section 
scrutinizes three strategies Kantian statists have come up with in order to 
solve this problem – based on the proximity, occupancy, and permissive 
principles – and shows why each of them fails to license (within the 
parameters of Kantian statism) a particular way of carving up the earth’s 
surface into jurisdictional domains. In the final section, I conclude that the 
impossibility to close the justificatory gap does not require Kantians to cede 
statist grounds altogether, but incites an altered, distinctly cosmopolitan 
perspective on states.  
 
2. Territorial jurisdiction and the justificatory 
gap 
 
One of the most momentous features of our political world is that it 
is made up of states. Characteristically, states are territorial entities: their 
claim to make and enforce law (to exercise legitimate authority) pertains to 
a particular bounded geographical area and the people present within it at a 
particular point in time. Although this fact is so deeply entrenched in 
modern life that it may be hard to even imagine different forms of political 
organisation, it is far from being an unalterable feature of the human 
condition, or even of organized, law-governed human associations. Human 
societies have in the past lived together under institutions with central 
authority but no fixed borders (like empires), or even within feudal 
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structures where political relationships collapsed into personal 
relationships of authority and obedience (cf. Pierson 2004). Yet, 
notwithstanding recent diffident developments (in global politics) towards 
more fragmented forms of sovereignty that may be taken to foreshadow 
that this connection need not be here to stay forever, for the time being our 
world remains one divided into institutions linked to particular pieces of 
the earth. Due to this territorial nature, states claim what is usually called 
jurisdictional rights: to make and enforce rules over continuous 
geographical areas.  
Let us get a bit clearer on this claim to territorial jurisdiction by 
delineating it from two further normative concepts that are related but of 
different extension: legitimacy or legitimate authority, and territorial rights. 
Territorial rights are usually taken to have three distinct dimensions 
(Simmons 2001, p. 305): the state’s claim to make and enforce law within its 
borders, to extract and use the natural resources on its territory, and to 
control its borders. Jurisdictional rights thus only figure as one element of a 
more extensive bundle of rights-claims that states make with regard to their 
territory, each of which requires separate justification. While modern states 
typically claim all three kinds of rights, in this paper I will solely focus on 
the claim to territorial jurisdiction. For, while we can at least hypothetically 
conceive of a state that lacks entitlements to exclusively control the natural 
resources that good fortune happens to have located in it or to exclude 
potential immigrants from entering it,3 territorial jurisdiction instead seems 
to be a constitutive component of modern statehood.4 If it turned out that 
the claim to territorial jurisdiction cannot be vindicated, what we normally 
think of as states would no longer exist. Hence, in what follows I will 
discuss the question of territorial jurisdiction without reference to 
(legitimate restrictions on) immigration and (legitimate distribution of) 
natural resources – although our answer to the former will surely have 
repercussions when it comes to the latter.  
On the other hand and more importantly, we can delineate 
territorial jurisdiction from the concept of legitimacy, or legitimate 
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authority. Legitimacy describes a moral status that we ascribe to a political 
institution that fulfils certain criteria, and/or the norms emanating from it. 
It endows this institution with a specific normative advantage to create 
morally binding norms for those named as its subjects, and to coercively 
enforce them.5 Territorial jurisdiction specifies a particular form in which 
authority can be exercised: namely, against everyone present at a certain 
point in time within a certain geographically defined area. That people can 
have a part of their rights and obligations defined by an institution merely 
by being present in the territory over which this institution governs points 
to the remarkable fact that membership and subjection are not coextensive 
when it comes to modern states. That is to say, while state citizenship is 
sufficient for being subject to the state’s authority (states typically claim 
authority also against non-resident citizens, for instance to pay taxes or to 
do their military service), it is not necessary: states also enforce their laws 
(and take themselves to legitimately do so) against visitors and non-citizen 
residents.6 These are individuals who, while physically present at a certain 
point in time at a piece of geographical space that the community claims as 
subject to its control, lack the more direct ties that characterise citizens’ 
relation to their own community. While territorial jurisdiction is thus at its 
core – like legitimate authority – a claim to a moral power over persons, it 
crucially adds a spatial element: it specifies that a particular institution (the 
modern state) claims authority over everyone within a particular bounded 
area. Notice that neither the traditional question ‘under which conditions 
one agent could, from a moral point of view, have authority over another 
agent’, nor the answers traditionally provided (in terms of consent, 
membership, fairness or the like) take account of this spatial dimension, as 
would be required in order to normatively inform the real-world practice of 
territorial jurisdiction. 
The crucial implication for the purposes of this paper relates to the 
way in which claims to jurisdiction come with an expansion of 
argumentative burden compared to legitimate authority simpliciter. For, a 
claim to make and enforce law within a territory does not merely impose a 
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duty (to obey the law) against those who are directly addressed qua 
membership. 7 What is more, ‘institutional outsiders’ also have a duty 
imposed on them to respect the legitimate jurisdiction of the respective 
state. This duty is bipartite: on the one hand, outsiders have a duty not to 
interfere with or undermine the (legitimate) institution’s exercise of 
authority within its boundaries, or set up alternative institutions there (Stilz 
2011a, p. 573, Waldron 1993, p. 17). This is a duty of unlimited range 
incumbent upon everyone regardless of whether they ever become subject 
to the first-order norms a state issues. And second, they have imposed on 
them a duty to submit – if and when present within the relevant territory – 
to the rules set by the institution that claims the territory as subject to its 
control. Consequently, at the extension from a specifically moral power to 
make laws, to an entitlement to do so within specific boundaries, emerges 
what I call a justificatory gap: additional reasons (for the exercise of political 
authority within a particular territory) need to be given to those whose 
normative situation is significantly changed without them being member of 
the institution.  
 To make this more vivid, imagine a hypothetical scenario where 
individuals A, B and C live in a world not yet territorially partitioned. Now 
A and B decide to enter into political relations in order to regulate their 
interactions. While this leaves C initially unaffected, the situation changes 
as soon as A and B decide to territorially materialize their political project, 
claiming a particular territory as subject to their jurisdiction. In so doing, 
they impose a bipartite duty on C: not only is the relevant land out of reach 
for any political project C may want to realise herself at some point. What is 
more, whenever C is from now on physically present within the territory – 
let us assume it includes an impressive mountain range that C, a passionate 
mountaineer, frequently visits – she will be subjected to the laws set by the 
institutions through which A and B cooperate politically. Some reason 
needs to be given to C for the change in her normative situation brought 
about by A and B’s claim to subject the territory to their control. 
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Some aspects of the problem I have developed in this section may 
reverberate with what is discussed in the territorial rights literature as the 
‘particularity problem’ (e.g. Moore 2015, pp.87-100; Nine 2012, 27),8 that is 
the question how to move from a general justification of territorial rights to 
justifying specific areas being under control by particular states. Indeed, the 
problem I focus on is not entirely unrelated in the sense that a state’s claim 
to exercise jurisdiction is of course always a claim to do so over a particular 
piece of land. However, approaching this question against the background 
of the justificatory gap gives us a different perspective on the kind of 
normative endeavour we are engaged in when attaching particular peoples 
to particular bits of territory: it turns our attention away from related 
questions familiar from disputes about legitimate authority – remnants of 
which are often still present in the territorial rights literature – ,9 to the 
underlying accounts of what entitles agents to exercise normative control 
over objects. For, as we have seen, this is the added normative burden as we 
go from a claim over people, to a claim over people within a certain 
geographic area. It is this aspect that I shall turn to now. 
 
3. Kantian statism and a Lockean way out 
 
 
In the last section, a brief conceptual analysis of territorial 
jurisdiction yielded the insight that a justificatory gap emerges at the 
transition from reflection upon political authority, to state authority 
specifically. This gap emanates from the duties imposed on outsiders when 
a political community (through their institutions) organises itself politically 
within specified territorial boundaries. I also pointed to the fact that, as a 
consequence, a theory’s success in dealing with this problem will 
prominently hang on the justificatory structure of the underlying account of 
rights over objects.10 My aim in this section is to show why this leaves the 
Kantian statist account (e.g. Hodgson 2010, Ripstein 2009, Stilz 2011b, 
Waldron 2011) in a uniquely problematic position with regard to the 
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justificatory gap. Notice, to that effect, that we can distinguish two ways of 
conceptualising the duties imposed on outsiders when an agent claims 
normative control over an object (Van der Vossen 2015, pp. 68-72): in the 
case of duty-creation, a new duty is brought into being that did not exist 
before. According to duty-activation, in contrast, a unilateral claim merely 
enacts a pre-existing duty. For instance, when I step into your path, I do not 
create a de novo duty for you not to run me over, but merely activate your 
prior natural duty not to do me harm.11 I want to show that it is the fact that 
the Kantian statist account, unlike its Lockean competitor, rests on a 
construal of unilateral appropriation as duty-creation, which critically raises 
the justificatory burden with regard to claims to territorial jurisdiction. 
Kantian Statism and Duty-Creation. In order to understand the 
predicament of the Kantian framework, we need to highlight the way in 
which it grounds a rationale for political authority in specific considerations 
about the possibility of property rights. The starting premise of the Kantian 
statist account is that all individuals have an equal basic right to set and 
pursue their purposes independently of the wills of others, i.e. to 
autonomously make the decisions that govern their own life, together with 
an obligation to respect others’ equal right to do so (Ripstein 2009, pp. 30-
56). Now, people do not pursue their ends in empty space, but tend to do so 
by taking up means: they claim as theirs objects outside of them. Effective 
self-determination without being subject to the choices of others, the 
argument goes, requires the possibility of excluding them from the use of 
certain objects, and hence the possibility of having full-fledged property 
rights (Stilz 2011b, pp. 39/40). For, any remotely complex project that 
individuals set out to pursue will require them to appropriate external 
objects. The problem is that, in unilaterally appropriating objects of their 
choice, individuals create new obligations for others. In doing so, they take 
themselves to possess natural authority over them, i.e. to partly determine 
(as well as interpret and ultimately enforce) their rights and obligations. For 
the Kantian, such an assertion of natural moral powers is a non-starter 
among moral equals, since no person is any more entitled than any other to 
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determine the terms of their interactions. The solution consists in joint 
entrance into the ‘civil condition’: only a collective or ‘general’ will, 
embodied in the state, is entitled to make public coercive law that puts 
everyone under the pertinent obligations. In providing a public 
interpretation of these rights and obligations and imposing it on everyone, 
the state coordinates interpersonal interactions such that nobody is subject 
to another’s arbitrary choice.  
Notice an important implication of this argument: particular 
holdings can only exist within a distributive scheme publicly defined and 
enforced by a third party. While the Kantian statist account provides a 
general rationale for the existence of a system of property rights as a whole 
– it enables individuals to pursue their projects consistently with each their 
equal right to freedom – what we do not get is an account of individuation 
that would allow us to tell a story how people can come to have particular 
holdings (outside the civil condition). Notice that we face a structurally 
analogous problem when it comes to rights over territory. The Kantian 
argument gives us a general rationale for territorial states as we know them, 
grounded in a moral requirement to live under authorities that make and 
enforce law valid for everyone present within a certain geographical area. 
What remains a conceptual blind spot, however, are the possible grounds 
upon which a particular state could legitimately claim to do so within a 
particular territory – a story that needs to be told in order to bridge the 
justificatory gap. For, to unilaterally claim a territory as subject to one’s 
control is to (problematically) create a new duty on outsiders to respect this 
claim.  
Lockean Statism and Duty-Activation. Now compare the Kantian 
framework to an alternative Lockean story (e.g. Schmidtz 1990, Simmons 
1994, Van der Vossen 2009). What justifies property rights on this account 
is not the particular kind of moral relation they make possible, but their 
contribution to the fulfilment of human basic interests. 12  People’s 
fundamental, e.g. autonomy-related, interest in having secure access to and 
exclusive control over what is theirs is taken to ground a general right to 
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own property within certain limits. In a second step, this general right is 
individuated: people can acquire entitlements over previously unowned 
objects by performing specified acts on them, e.g. mixing their labour or 
making efficient use of them. The boundaries of this share are set by certain 
provisos that ensure others’ equal fulfilment of the relevant interests. 
Within these constraints, I can unilaterally impose on others obligations to 
respect my rights in what I acquire. For, crucially these duties are not newly 
created, but merely activate a prior duty to respect my right to what I 
successfully acquire in accordance with and within the limits of a prior 
moral right to own property in general. Such acts of duty-activation are thus 
taken to be a “common and unproblematic feature of moral life” (Van der 
Vossen 2015, p. 71) that involve no special moral legislative authority.  
Once we think about rights in territorial jurisdiction within this 
conceptual structure, the justificatory burden is of course much lower: all 
that needs to be shown is how an important interest justifies a general right 
to territory, which the relevant agent (e.g. a people, nation, or state) can 
then unilaterally individuate by relating to the land in a particular way. The 
duty imposed on outsiders is not created anew, but specifies a prior duty to 
respect rights in territory thus acquired (given the relevant provisos hold). 
We can see this most clearly in accounts of rights over territory that take 
direct inspiration from Locke (Simmons 2001, Steiner 2005). On this view, 
individuals can generate a natural entitlement to a piece of land in virtue of 
performing certain acts, like labouring or occupying it. They then each 
decide to transfer elements of their property rights over their particular area 
to the state, whose right to territorial jurisdiction emerges by aggregation. 
The duties imposed on others through controlling a piece of land are 
contingent on their conformity with the pertinent provisos: claims to 
territory are legitimate under the condition that what remains for other 
communities either constitutes a ‘fair’ or ‘equal’ share of the common stock 
(Simmons 2001, Steiner 2005) or at least does not prevent them from 
meeting their own basic needs (Nine 2012, p. 27).13  
The Lockean story thus lends itself to a significant shift in 
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argumentative burden: as long as territorial boundaries have emerged in 
accordance with the specified provisos,14 states have a prima facie right to a 
claimed territory. Thomas Christiano (2006, p. 82) calls this the 
conservation principle: unless there are cases of sever injustice towards 
insiders or outsiders, there is a strong moral presumption in favour of 
existing boundaries, regardless of how ‘arbitrary’ their histories are. As long 
as the relevant provisos have been and continue to be met, existing 
territories can be justified with regard to genealogies of their emergence. 
The Kantian statist instead does not have this strategy at her avail, as the 
justificatory burden is significantly higher: she cannot just stipulate that any 
existing state is justified in making law within its particular territory, as 
long as it has come to hold this power in the appropriate way and continues 
to exercise it legitimately. Even the introduction of additional ‘external’ 
legitimacy requirements specifying how institutions ought to relate to 
outsiders when it comes to both the establishment and exercise of its 
territorial jurisdiction, for instance with respect to the human rights of 
outside individuals and the territorial sovereignty of other states (Buchanan 
2004, p. 266 ff., Stilz 2011a, p. 590 ff.), does little in attenuating this 
conclusion. These criteria may help specify the conditions under which 
existing boundaries could be rightfully protected and preserved, but do not 
bring us any closer to establishing territorial boundaries and respective 
subject populations in the first place. What Kantian statists need to do in 
order to maintain the consistency of their framework is provide, from 
within its internal logic, a positive criterion for connecting particular 
territories with particular states – a criterion that cannot merely have 
recourse to the institution’s internal structure, or the represented 
collective’s relation (e.g. attachment) to the land. In the next section, I will 
examine three criteria – based on the proximity, occupancy and permissive 
principles respectively – that Kantian statists have come up with in response 
to this problem. 
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4. Three Kantian strategies 
 
 
In the last section, I have laid out why the gap that emerges at the 
transition from justifying political authority to justifying state authority 
looms particularly large for Kantian statists. Prima facie, the rationale 
provided for territorial jurisdiction – in contrast to a broadly Lockean 
alternative – lacks a criterion upon which specific pieces of land could be 
identified (or unilaterally claimed) as subject to the authority of specific 
institutions. Aware of this problem, Kantian statists have developed a 
number of argumentative twists that would allow for such an individuation 
while staying within the conceptual purview of their preferred narrative. I 
will argue that none of the three strategies scrutinized in this section 
succeeds in this endeavour. 
 
 
 
 
The proximity principle 
 
The first strategy, which has been put forward by Jeremy Waldron 
(1993, 2011), offers an empiricised version of the Kantian statist account laid 
out in the last section. Recall that the argument in its general form derived 
the need for political authority from a conceptual puzzle pertaining to 
rights over objects: in unilaterally claiming and enforcing what I take to be 
my property, I illegitimately arrogate to myself a moral authority I do not 
have. Only a public authority, in making coercive law valid for everyone, 
prevents people from mutually imposing on each other their unilateral 
interpretations of what is theirs. Waldron’s empiricised version of what up 
to this point takes the form of a purely moral problem focuses on how 
individuals’ wills concretely instantiate, and clash, in empirical reality: 
namely, within quarrels about concrete objects, land, and resources. Under 
the assumption that it is among those living ‘unavoidably side by side’ that 
these conflicts are most frequent and endemic,15 we can ‘localise’ what 
started as a general moral duty to enter into the civil condition: following 
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Waldron’s ‘proximity principle’ (1993, p. 14), it is those immediately adjacent 
to me with whom I ought to establish a political institution so that our 
disputes can be resolved consistently within a single coherent framework of 
laws. 16  While he concedes that the scope of the state-centred legal 
framework might have to be extended with an expanding sphere of human 
interactions, on his view there is something about the very frequency and 
intensity of the disputes among those in physical proximity that uniquely 
indicates the need for a standing arrangement like the modern state as 
opposed to piecemeal conflict-solution. In order to account for the presence 
of particular states in particular areas, however, an additional assumption is 
required: that ‘humans are not spread out evenly across the face of the 
earth, but clustered together in a plurality of distinct localities’ (Waldron 
2011, p. 10). The idea is that geographical factors like the unequal 
distribution of resources on earth attract people unevenly to different 
locations. While we may have occasional interactions with people 
elsewhere, our most ‘frequent repeat players’ (Waldron 2011, p. 11) will be 
those we share a ‘cluster’ with. 
Now, it is not entirely clear what job Waldron actually wants the 
proximity principle to do. Sometimes, he presents the argument as allowing 
us both to ‘explain the emergence of particular states in particular areas’ 
(Waldron 2011, p. 14), and offering a normative criterion for drawing the 
boundaries in the rare cases where this is within our control. But of course, 
he is aware both that people nowadays just do not live in clustered groups 
(but are virtually dispersed continuously over the earth) and that the 
current allocation of peoples and territories into separate states is the result 
mostly of violent histories rather than organically growing communities 
gradually approaching one another. Given that I find myself in one polity 
with some people that I live side by side with, but not with others (who are 
just on the other side of the border), the proximity principle will not do the 
desired work in carving up the earth in a non-arbitrary way. 
Waldron thus shifts the focus of his argument: away from actual 
physical to a kind of ‘legal proximity’ that arises among co-citizens once 
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borders have been (arbitrarily) drawn and respective addressees of the laws 
‘cleared up’. The thought is that the incipient arbitrariness sets off a 
normatively relevant path dependency: once people share political 
institutions, ‘the comparatively higher frequency, density and entanglement 
of interaction will survive the approach of the populations towards one 
another’ (Waldron 2011, p. 15). The entire argumentative burden now rests 
on the institutional ties that bind together citizens once they are subject to 
a common institution. This, however, puts the cart before the horse. Of 
course an agglomeration of individuals will, once they are institutionally 
constituted as a ‘people’, have a higher density of interactions and share 
bonds they did not share before. Yet, we want to know what entitles a state 
in materialising its authority here and now, not how it got to acquire and 
consolidate it. Does this mean that my criticism is only valid under the 
specific current circumstances of worldwide contiguous human 
settlement?17 In a way it does. But this just results from the way in which 
the justificatory gap presents itself to the Kantian framework. We saw in the 
last section that the Kantian cannot help herself to a genealogy of 
boundaries, but needs to provide criteria for claims to territory as they 
stand. It is this task that the proximity principle falls short of. For, 
understood as physical proximity, it fails to justify the boundaries of 
precisely those existing polities that currently claim our allegiance, or 
indeed any alternative set of concrete boundaries. Understood as legal 
proximity, instead, it collapses into the conservation principle. 
 
 
The occupation principle  
 
Anna Stilz (2009, 2011a, 2013) has recently suggested an alternative 
way of particularizing claims in territorial jurisdiction, drawing on what we 
can call the occupation principle.18 While Stilz (2011a, p. 579) agrees with the 
Kantian institutionalism about property rights, she worries that an 
orthodox version of this view is unable to account for a strongly held 
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intuition: if rights to objects do only exist under institutionalised schemes 
of property, it is difficult to explain what is wrong about the forceful 
removal of non-state (e.g. nomadic) groups of people from their homeland. 
She thus introduces the concept of occupancy rights as pre-institutional 
(and thus limited) claims to land, which are weaker than full-blown 
property rights but ought to be respected by any institutional scheme 
potentially established on the pertinent land. While it is still the state that 
holds the territorial right (not a cultural nation, or individual property 
holders), the right is derived from a prior and more fundamental occupancy 
right – a right to reside on the land in question – held by the people on 
whose behalf the state is operating. Hence, all that must be shown is that 
the people whom the state represents have rights of occupancy – given that 
these pre-institutional rights to land are by definition particularized claims 
to a specific area (Stilz, 2013, p. 334), they are supposed to provide the 
desired move that allows us to subsequently justify the state’s jurisdiction 
over a bounded territory. 
So what precisely is an occupancy right? Stilz defines it as ‘the right 
to reside permanently in a place, to participate in the practices that are 
ongoing there, and to be immune from expropriation or removal’ (Stilz 2013, 
p. 327). It contains two instances: a liberty to reside permanently in a 
particular space and to make use of it, together with a claim right against 
others not to be removed from that area. According to Stilz’s ‘plan-based 
account’, these rights are grounded in people’s autonomy-related interests 
in stable residence at a particular place. Many of our life-plans and projects 
are ‘located’ (Stilz 2013, p. 338), that is they unfold and hence require 
residence at a certain place – from our engagement in social relationships 
and economic practices to membership in religious, social, and cultural 
organizations. The ensuing interest to stay in our communities and 
amongst people with whom we have these relationships is sufficiently 
weighty to hold others under a prima face duty to respect this occupancy.19 
Three conditions need to be fulfilled in order acquire an occupancy right: a 
person needs to reside at a particular place now or has done so previously; 
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residence within that territory needs to be fundamental to the integrity of 
her structure of personal relationships, goals, and pursuits; and finally, the 
connection to the particular territory was formed through no fault of her 
own (Stilz 2011a, p. 585). 
We can grant to Stilz the plausible idea that individuals can have 
some kind of entitlement to be where they are, regardless of whether they 
live under state institutions or not.20 Much less clear is how we can derive 
rights to territorial jurisdiction from these occupancy rights, for two 
reasons: first, occupancy rights are relatively weak use-rights that can 
overlap (several people who live in proximity can have occupancy rights 
over the same place grounded in various located projects and practices), 
while rights in jurisdiction are much stronger rights to exclusively control 
an environment (Stilz 2013, p. 350). The justificatory gap, which we are 
concerned with, only emanates from this stronger claim. Second, occupancy 
rights are explicitly individual rights for Stilz. While she concedes that there 
may be derivative group rights to occupancy, these are nothing more than 
an ‘aggregated bundle of individual occupancy rights’ (Stilz 2011a, p. 579). 
That is to say, from an individual right that enables autonomous agents to 
pursue their projects at a particular place we need to get to a collective right 
that enables them to control collectively, through institutions, their 
geographical environment.  
In her attempt to conceptualise a group with a strong, shared 
interest in jointly and exclusively controlling the territory they occupy, Stilz 
is of course constrained by the parameters of the Kantian statist framework 
she is committed to. We have seen that, on this account, states are not mere 
vehicles for the self-determination of pre-politically defined groups, but are 
tasked with solving distinctive moral coordination problems. In order to 
avoid a cultural nationalist narrative, Stilz thus argues that a ‘people’ in the 
relevant sense need not pre-exist a state, but can in fact be brought into 
being by it. The idea is that, merely in virtue of sharing and cooperating 
together in state institutions, an unconnected group of individual persons 
may over time be made into a people with the kind of moral bonds that 
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support their state’s claim to the territory comprised by aggregated 
occupancy rights. A ‘people’ is thus defined by Stilz as a group that a) has 
established a history of political cooperation together by sharing a state in 
the recent past, and b) possesses the ability to reconstitute and sustain a 
legitimate state on their territory today (Stilz 2011a, p. 591). That is to say 
that only where a number of individuals already share state institutions, or 
have recently done so,21 do their combined occupancy rights translate into 
territorial rights. Unfortunately, again this leaves us without a non-circular 
criterion for connecting a particular group of individuals to a particular 
territory: the moral boundaries of legitimate jurisdiction collapse into the 
de facto boundaries of existing states. To be fair, the state-modelled notion 
of peoplehood is only supposed to deliver a necessary, not a sufficient 
criterion for legitimate claims to territory. Stilz puts great emphasis on the 
additional claim that the state also needs to exercise its authority in a way 
representative of the people it governs. So if, for instance, Russia was to re-
appropriate one of its former territories such as Estonia, and then govern it 
effectively, Stilz would deny that the new enlarged state possesses territorial 
rights on the grounds that it contains a group with occupancy rights for 
whom 'Greater Russia' is not a legitimate state.22 Yet, note that in order to 
be thus representable in the first place, a ‘people’ already needs to cooperate 
politically (or have recently done so) within state-based institutions. Just 
like Waldron and his proximity principle, Stilz’s account thus falls back onto 
the conservation principle.  
 
The permissive principle 
 
The third Kantian solution to the problem of territorial statehood, 
suggested by Lea Ypi (2013a, 2014), starts from an explicit recognition of (a 
version of) the justificatory gap: given that initial acquisition as well as 
continued control over territory affects all those permanently excluded 
from the territory, she argues, it needs to be justified universally. The only 
way to overcome this gap is dynamically in historical time. That is to say, 
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‘the citizens of each state are entitled to the particular territory they 
collectively occupy if an only if they are also politically committed to the 
establishment of a global political authority realising just reciprocal 
relations’ (Ypi 2014, p. 288). We are required to rise above the initial 
injustice of unilateral occupation by ‘invest[ing] political efforts in creating 
a kind of political association in which territorial claims can be subject to 
global, public arbitration’ (Ypi 2014, p. 288). Instead of looking backwards at 
how states have come to hold their current territory, or how in the present 
they actually achieve what they are morally tasked with, Ypi thus proposes a 
turn to the future: given the unavailability of principles on the basis of 
which we could legitimately draw boundaries, we should focus on ‘how 
states now act politically to overcome the unilaterality of that initial 
acquisition’ (Ypi 2014, p. 303). Once the required global political association 
is in place, states are required to submit to the rules of jointly framed 
political institutions that rightfully regulate the claims of all. 
The role particular states play with a view to such a global authority 
is purely instrumental: they are a ‘first approximation’ (Ypi 2014, p. 301) to 
the realization of the required all-inclusive polity, a first step beyond the 
stage of moral anarchy. Hence, states’ claims to territory can at most be 
‘permitted’ – that is to say, they are justified provisionally and conditionally 
upon their contribution to a state of affairs that rectifies the injustice that 
they themselves constitute. Ypi thus draws a direct analogy to Kant’s 
property argument, the rough structure of which should be familiar at this 
point. We have seen how it arises from a fundamental tension: while 
purposive agents need to claim external objects as theirs, unilateral 
acquisition is at the same time deeply problematic. What we have not 
attended to so far is the ‘permissive principle’ (lex permissiva, in Kant-
speak) that Kant employs in order to overcome this impasse. Generally 
speaking, a permissive principle is an authorization to make an exception to 
a general prohibition in order to realize an obligatory end. In the case of the 
property argument, a permissive principle provisionally allows unilateral 
appropriation under the condition of joint entrance into the civil condition 
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where property rights can be enjoyed through collective rules of arbitration 
and enforcement. The duty of state entrance mitigates the arbitrariness of 
exclusion manifest in the unilaterality of initial acquisition. Now, by analogy 
Ypi wants to argue that territorial states can be ‘permitted’ if, and in so far 
as, they contribute to the establishment of a global authority realising all-
inclusive principles of right. Just as property claims remain provisional until 
their vindication by public authority, claims to territory remain provisional 
until carried over into a global authority.23 Ypi’s willingness to bite the 
bullet promisingly turns a theoretical outlook that threatens to become a 
conceptual stasis – the insight that unilateral acts of settlement and the 
ensuing sets of boundaries are always necessarily arbitrary – into a 
progressive political project. Nevertheless, the notion of a provisional right 
(that permissive principles are said to give rise to), which is at the heart of 
this transitional logic, remains mysterious and ultimately allows for two 
very contrasting evaluations of the status of existing states and their claims 
to territory.24  
On a more moderate reading, the permissibility framework is 
supposed to enable us to actually theorise existing states’ claim to territory. 
Indeed, many of Ypi’s remarks may be taken to indicate that the 
requirement to leave statehood behind is not that categorical after all. For 
instance, she repeatedly emphasises that states can at most be ‘invited but 
not coerced to enter in rightful political relations with other states’ (Ypi 
2014, p. 306). The borders of recalcitrant states cannot be arbitrarily 
dissolved or redrawn on the grounds that they refuse to make their 
territorial claims ‘conclusive’ by joining a wider political association. Yet, 
unfortunately she neither explicates what the conditions of permissibility 
are – what exactly it means to ‘invest political efforts’ (Ypi 2014, p. 309) – 
nor does it become clear what it would actually mean for a state and its 
claim over territory to be merely provisionally ‘permitted’, as opposed to 
conclusively justified. Clearly, the former claim is normatively weaker than 
the latter, but neither are we told in which way precisely this is the case, nor 
whether and how this curtails any of the claims states make against both 
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insiders and outsiders. The suspicion is hence that once again what we end 
up with is a version of the conservation principle, invoking a strong 
presumption for existing territories and boundaries. At the end of the day, 
Ypi claims, ‘even though acquisition of a particular territory is a result of 
historical and political contingencies that can only be retroactively justified, 
this contingency does not authorize us to modify the present partition of 
boundaries’ (Ypi 2014, p. 309).  
On an alternative and more radical reading of Ypi’s argument, states 
represent really nothing more than a transitory stage on an unstoppable 
path to an all-inclusive political community. Their transient purpose is to 
work towards their own dissolution in favour of a – supremely coercive – 
global institutional scheme that liberates us from the arbitrariness of 
existing boundaries. Embracing the Kantian framework would then 
essentially rule out a form of statism as understood so far. Is this the 
conclusion we are ultimately left with?  
 
5. Theorising states from a global standpoint 
 
 
None of the three strategies scrutinized in the last section succeeded 
in providing Kantian statists with the argumentative resources to make 
good – within the confines of their preferred framework – on modern states’ 
claim to exercise legal supremacy over a bounded geographic area. Its very 
conceptual structure, it seems, makes it impossible for the account to 
license a particular way of carving up the earth’s surface. According to a 
radical reading of Lea Ypi’s permissive strategy, recognising the arbitrariness 
of jurisdictional domains ultimately requires us to overcome a state-based 
international order. I do agree with her claim that, within Kantian 
parameters, there is no way of closing the justificatory gap. Yet, in this 
section I want to challenge her conclusion that the normative pressure that 
stems from this insight necessarily entails the need to ‘liberate’ us from it by 
rectifying it historically. Rather than overcoming statehood, it should urge 
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us to explore ways and means of transforming the way we conceive of it. 
For, I think there are good reasons, both external and immanent to the 
Kantian framework, for safeguarding the statist model. Let me briefly point 
to each in turn. 
First, it seems to me that we are in general well-advised to be rather 
cautious about vindicating state dissolution in favour of a single unified 
world community. I do not just want to dismiss the idea of a world state, as 
is often done, with a brief reference to Kant’s famous ‘soulless despotism’ 
concern (Kant 1996, p. 356). I acknowledge that recent work has gone some 
way in conceiving of institutional models beyond a global leviathan (e.g 
Scheuerman 2014, Ulas 2015). However, I do share the scepticism of many 
theorists as to our capacity to (both intellectually and practically) transfer, 
and implement globally, ideas and ideals that have been very much 
developed from within and for the nation-state framework –  from 
centralised political control to democratic authorship and political 
participation – onto the global stage.25 It is considerations like these that 
suggest that something akin to a world of plural sovereign states with the 
capacity for dealing with justice locally ultimately remains favourable to a 
world state. 
More importantly, however, I would like to direct your attention to a 
consideration grounded within the logic of the Kantian account itself. The 
idea is that established states, in enabling at least some people to interact 
on rightful terms by having their rights and obligations publicly defined, 
constitute a moral achievement of a particular kind. Kant claims that, in 
doing so, they acquire a moral personality of their own which that would be 
annihilated were they incorporated into a larger coercive unit (Kant 1996, p. 
318; see also Flikschuh 2010). In other words, there is a morally significant 
disanalogy between sovereign entities – which are already omnilateral wills 
of sorts, even if bounded – acting in the international sphere, and 
individuals acting unilaterally in a state of nature.  
If we stay with this very idea for a moment, we can see why the 
Kantian framework does not only provide good reasons to consider ways of 
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transforming the state rather than overcoming it, but also conceptual 
resources to do so. To this effect, I need to say a word about Kant’s 
philosophical method more general. At the centre of Kant’s philosophy lies 
what is often referred to as the ‘Copernican Turn’: simply speaking, the idea 
that philosophy needs to attend to the structure of human cognition and 
volition rather than the structure of the world. This change amounts to a 
radical shift in perspective from the (third-personal) observer’s point of 
view, to the (first-personal) perspective of the agent. Rather than making 
deductive inferences from first principles, Kant asks us to draw out the 
(epistemological or moral) conditions of possibility of a given experiential 
or practical context that we find ourselves in. My aim here is not to go into 
any detail about this wider philosophical method, or assess its merits. I just 
want to point out that it quite fundamentally changes the way in which 
Kant approaches the question of the justificatory gap. For, he is just not 
interested in (providing criteria for) dividing up the earth into territories 
from something like an Archimedean ‘view from nowhere’. Rather, Kant 
holds us to reflect on the moral implications of the fact that the boundaries 
of territorial states, as we find them, are necessarily arbitrary. 
This provides us with an alternative way of spelling out the 
cosmopolitan implications that are, undoubtedly, inherent to the Kantian 
justification of political authority. To acknowledge that states always 
normatively point beyond themselves does not entail the need to overcome 
them, but to look at them from a different, genuinely global perspective. On 
the methodological level, this changes the way in which we theorise states 
from the outset: reflection upon states and what justifies them in exercising 
the right to rule within their territory cannot proceed regardless of the 
wider normative relations they are embedded in. For Kantians, that is to 
say, global political theorising cannot be a mere afterthought – they cannot 
turn their attention to global normative thinking only after having settled 
the matter of legitimate authority domestically. Hence, the de facto 
separation between what is until today theorised as two distinct theoretical 
discourses – legitimate state authority on the one hand, global political 
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morality on the other – cannot be consistently upheld. Debates on the 
justification of political authority (and, very much in line with this stance, 
recent disputes about territorial rights) still very much continue to start 
from the assumption that states can be theorised ‘one at a time’ and largely 
independently of global concerns. This does not entail that Kantians need 
to entirely collapse the two theoretical projects of state and global 
theorising into one other. What it does entail is that they cannot just 
proceed with the state-centred business as usual, given that – from their 
perspective – the intelligibility of whatever first-order normative question 
depends on a prior, or higher-order claim to territorial jurisdiction that 
cannot be conclusively justified.  
My primary aim here is to point out that there is a conceptual space 
for such a fundamentally revised form of Kantian statism. While I do not 
have the space to fill it out in any detail, let me end with two suggestions 
that anticipate what this could look like. The first idea just follows Kant in 
the conclusion that, I take it, he draws himself from the remaining 
justificatory gap: the need to complement the domestic arena with 
international (between states) and cosmopolitan (between citizens and 
states other than their own) realms, constituting a tripartite ‘system’ of right 
with three functionally differentiated yet conceptually interdependent 
domains of institutionalisation. Following the argument indicated in the 
last paragraph, the thought is that while states (qua existence) have a moral 
personality of sorts, this very status comes with wider, more encompassing 
obligations towards other states and outside individuals. Kant is quite 
adamant that if any of the three levels is lost sight of, ‘the framework of all 
the others is unavoidably undermined and must finally collapse’ (Kant 1996, 
p. 455). Domestic and global spheres are so intimately tied to one another 
that ‘the problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate 
to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, 
and cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved’ (Kant 1991, p. 47). As 
basic as this insight seems for readers of Kant’s political philosophy, it has 
been quite woefully neglected in the recent statist wave. 
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A second suggestion goes beyond Kant’s own focus on questions of 
transnational order and explores a changed perspective on the internal 
structure of states themselves. Peter Niesen (2012) and David Owen (2014), 
for instance, argue that the current intellectual climate with its heavy focus 
on overarching supranational collectivities, constitutions, and governments 
and thus on ways of transcending the modern state, has (lamentably) 
directed our attention away from proposals that emphasise transformative 
potentials that inhere it. Only once we stop restricting our theoretical 
horizon exclusively to models of a post-national order will we be able to 
envision ways of transforming our world of states (and the pertinent ideals 
of membership and belonging) in a cosmopolitan direction. Under the label 
of a ‘cosmopolitanism in one country’, they thus conceptualise ways of 
transforming statehood through ‘cosmopolitan political activity’ from 
within. Niesen and Owen set out a number of concrete institutional 
implications this may yield, from ways of extending membership and 
participatory rights to foreigners, to far-reaching rights of migration and 
movement. For now, I want to abstain from assessing the respective merits 
of these proposals. What matters to me is the way in which they come out 
of an acknowledgement that the non-vindicability of territorial borders can 
leave a mark on the way in which we think about state practices and 
institutions themselves. We may not be able to overcome the (unavoidable) 
arbitrariness of the political world as we find it, but can at least go some 
way in accounting for, and attenuating, the normative pressure that stems 
from this insight. 
Conclusion  
 
The aim of this paper was to point out a problem for Kantian statism: 
the very way it justifies political authority, I argued, threatens to make the 
account inconsistent. For, the problematic structure of unilateral property 
claims from which Kantian statists deduce the need for public arbitration 
resurfaces analogously when it comes to states’ claim to make and enforce 
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law within a bounded geographical area. The argumentative moves 
proponents have worked out in order to overcome this problem boil down 
to two, equally unsatisfying, strategies: either they fall back on the 
conservation principle, putting up with the status quo of existing territories 
and boundaries, or they give up the possibility of bounded statehood 
altogether. My own proposal sought to point out that reflections on the fact 
that subjects just find themselves, for good or worse, thrown into an 
institutional landscape that is the result of mostly contingent and violent 
histories of drawing boundaries might actually yield progressive political 
implications. Awareness of the justificatory gap, I argued, should incite 
Kantians to take up a genuinely global perspective on states. My hope is 
that the gist of this conclusion – that theorising states in the face of rapidly 
changing global conditions requires thinking outside the box and daring a 
glance beyond our own nose instead of turning inwards and settle with 
accustomed ideas and convictions – has repercussions well beyond those 
who subscribe to the Kantian outlook that has been at the centre of my 
attention here. 
 
                                                     
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the LSE political 
philosophy workshop, graduate conferences at Sciences Po Paris and 
Harvard University, as well as the ECPR General Conference in Montreal. I 
am grateful to the audiences for their questions, as well as to Thomas 
Christiano, Katrin Flikschuh, Louis-Philippe Hodgson, David Miller, Peter 
Niesen, Arthur Ripstein, Cord Schmelzle, Annie Stilz, Laura Valentini and 
Lea Ypi for providing helpful feedback at different stages. I would also like 
to thank two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their insightful 
comments that helped me to improve the paper enormously. 
1 Kantian accounts of territorial rights are most explicitly defended by Stilz 
(2009, 2011a) and Ypi (2014). A good overview of positions defended in the 
wider debate is provided by Ypi (2013a). 
2 See for instance Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann (1997), Follesdal and Maliks 
(2013). 
3 The former position has been advocated e.g. by Thomas Pogge (2011), the 
latter by Joseph Carens (2013, pp. 270-72) and recently Clara Sandelind 
(2015). 
4 An anonymous reviewer has suggested to me that if a state involuntarily 
lost control over its resources or borders, e.g. through an external 
imposition of forces it cannot resist, it would also have lost central elements 
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of its sovereignty such that we might want to question its ongoing 
statehood. I take it, however, that in the depicted case, the loss of control 
over resources and borders only expresses (or is indicative of) a prior 
independent loss of sovereignty that makes the former possible in the first 
place. 
5 While some authors (e.g. Ladenson 1980) want to separate the notions of 
legitimacy and authority (reducing legitimacy to a mere permission to 
coerce), I stipulate an understanding of the term as containing an explicitly 
moral power to change the normative situation of those subject to it (for 
instance by imposing obligations or conferring rights on them).  
6 There is certainly a difference in degree of subjection between citizen and 
non-citizen residents, as there are a number of (‘civic’) rights and 
obligations that only accrue to the former. 
7 Throughout this paper, I will be using ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ 
interchangeably. 
8 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for urging me to clarify this. The 
‘particularity problem’ is also discussed by various authors in a symposium 
on territorial rights in International Theory 1(6), 2014. 
9 A. John Simmons (2013), for instance, has recently reframed his 
‘particularity problem’ known from earlier work on political authority as a 
‘boundary problem’ concerned with territorial jurisdiction. 
10 In order to draw this analogy, I do not intend to deny the important 
difference between first-order rights over objects (including entitlements to 
use, transfer, and exclude others) and second-order powers to make the 
rules that define these rights (and to interpret and enforce those rules over 
the territory in which the object is contained), which is well-rehearsed in 
the literature (Miller 2011; Stilz 2009, pp. 194-198). I am just capitalising on a 
specific similarity between two kinds of rights over objects that each 
unilaterally impose duties on third parties.  
11 Thanks to Anna Stilz for this example. 
12 I am not claiming to provide an accurate reconstruction of Locke’s own 
account here. Locke himself famously stipulated a right to own property 
grounded in God’s command to make use of the earth in order to preserve 
mankind (Locke 1988, II, Ch.5).  
13 A similar story could be told about nationalist accounts of territory 
(Meisels 2005; Miller 2012): they focus on the ways in which a nation can 
particularise, through entanglement with a specific piece of land, what they 
take to be a general right of nations to self-determine (through a territorial 
political entity). 
14 As one reviewer helpfully points out, the Lockean strategy may thus 
provide the ‘easier way out’ only in ideal theory; in the real world it will be 
very hard to actually identify existing holdings as complying with the rules 
of original appropriation and legitimate transfer. 
15 Waldron attaches much importance to Kant’s remark that ‘when you 
cannot avoid living side by side with all others, you ought to leave the state 
of nature and proceed with them into a rightful condition’ (Kant 1996, pp. 
451/2). 
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16 The assumption that it is those in my immediate vicinity with whom 
moral arbitration is particularly urgent might itself be questioned. For, in 
today’s world who is a threat to whom depends more and more on 
structural power relations mediated by markets and institutions that are 
largely independent of spatio-temporal proximity. However, for the sake of 
the argument I shall run with it here. 
17 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this line of argument. 
18 Margaret Moore (2015) has offered a very similar, though not primarily 
Kant-inspired account that centres around occupancy rights. 
19 This is merely a prima facie right as there are distributive constraints as 
well as other potentially overweighing considerations.  
20 Indeed Kant himself grants all individuals a ‘right to be wherever nature 
or chance (apart from their will) has placed them’ (Kant 1996, p. 414). 
21 Stilz (2011a, p. 575) does consider something like (temporally limited) 
‘residual’ peoplehood in cases where people who used to have a state do not 
have it anymore. 
22 I am grateful to David Miller for this example. 
23 Interpreters are in dispute how precisely to understand the idea of 
‘provisional’ property rights that could be acquired pre-politically under the 
permissive principle. While some argue that provisional rights are merely 
an inconclusive form of property rights that are subsequently rubber-
stamped by the state (e.g. Hruschka and Byrd, 2010), I side with those who 
point out that according to the very structure of Kant’s argument property 
rights are only possible under public authority (e.g. Flikschuh 2000). This is 
what causes the problematic lack of a criterion upon which to determine 
the particular shares that can be carried over into the ‘public condition’. 
24 I take it that the specific ambiguity I point out here is reflected in a wider 
tension in Ypi’s work as a whole, between statist commitments (e.g. Ypi 
2008) and the endorsement of more radical types of institutional change 
(e.g. Ypi 2013b). 
25 Some of these arguments are nicely summarised in Miller (2010). 
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